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Introduction and Method 
 
 What was law‟s place in the South African xenophobic violence of May 2008?  I 
wish first to distinguish three interpretations of this question as I will address in this 
chapter some aspects of only one of them.  One place of law in the xenophobic violence 
might be as one often thinks of law, as an after-the-fact accountability mechanism.  Put 
simply, South African law should (among other functions) hold accountable those 
responsible for the rapes, killings, and other acts of violence perpetrated in May 2008.  It 
should prosecute the offenders and, where appropriate, provide compensation to the 
victims.  It unfortunately seems relatively clear that too little of this work of the law was 
actually done or is being done.  For instance, according to a report in the press on 11 May 
2009, a year after the violence, not a single conviction for murder or rape had been 
secured.
2
  Of the 68 cases initially placed on the court roll, 35 have been withdrawn, 11 
found not-guilty, and only six resulted in guilty findings.  Four cases were sent back for 
further investigation and six were still running as of that date.  Statistics provided by the 
National Prosecuting Authority later in the year have indicated a single conviction for 
murder.
3
 
Another place of law might be as a direct facilitator of the state‟s response to the 
violence – through law‟s governance role in structuring the official response to the 
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manifest crisis.  In this place of law, one can focus on law‟s role in, for instance, 
empowering the declaration of a state of national or provincial disaster and the 
consequent release of state resources to cope with such a crisis.  To a very limited extent, 
law did indeed play such a role.  The “xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals” in the 
provinces of Gauteng and the Western Cape were classified as provincial states of 
disaster.
4
  Provincial disasters were declared by the premiers of the provinces of Gauteng 
and the Western Cape.
5
  These classifications and declarations indicated a judgment that 
the severity of the events was something intermediate between a local and a national 
disaster.
6
 Nonetheless, apart from pronouncements, the state response has been evaluated 
as inadequate.
7
 
In any case, this chapter will focus neither on the place of law as an accountability 
mechanism nor on its place as a facilitator of the state response to the crisis.  Rather, this 
chapter asks questions about the place of law in the actual violence itself.  So again, what 
was law‟s place in the xenophobic violence?  The lens through which I will explore this 
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Comment [W1]: Hi Loren.  You could 
easily put elipses in for (iii) or more of this 
legalistic definition as you judge fit. 
question is that of citizenship.  Despite the relatively recent nature of the xenophobic 
violence, the primary method that I adopt is a historical and institutional one.  The contest 
over the legitimate mobility of persons, particularly over the persons of the Asian 
population from the 1890s to the 1930s, was a significant if not the primary factor in 
constructing South African citizenship.
8
  Both the interests of economic actors in 
restricting the mobility of labor and the interest of political elites in establishing and 
safeguarding their status and identity within their communities motivated and influenced 
the regulation of mobility and thereby the South African concept of citizenship.  In this 
formative and significantly bureaucratic process, the legal, colonial, and demographic 
position of the Asian population proved particularly crucial to the development of South 
African citizenship.  Based on this identification of the shape and character of the legal 
cultural concept of South African citizenship as of the end point of my empirical research 
project 1937, this chapter addresses and reflects upon law‟s place in the xenophobic 
violence.  The effects of the historical origins of South African citizenship in the 
regulation of mobility of populations persist to the present day.
9
 
The lesson to be drawn from the above historical account of the creation of the 
South African community can be an optimistic and positive one.  Regulation of the 
mobility of three populations (Asian, African and European) between 1897 and 1937 
produced a legal cultural concept of citizenship based on official residence that was 
inclusive even if it was at the same time structurally unequal.
10
  Such a history arguably 
implicitly focuses on the positive aspect of state contact.  While a migration status may 
have been (and often was) a tool or marker of oppression, it was often at the same time a 
marker of status.  Even to be a non-Union native or an „Asiatic‟ (terms that today would 
be taboo) – was to confer certain rights of residence and legality in terms of official 
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policy and were labels positively desired and actively sought by many within those 
populations.   
Furthermore, attention to the Asian population in South Africa identified the legal 
status of that population as particularly significant in the production of South African 
citizenship.  Indeed, the struggles of Gandhi and other members of Indian political elite in 
the first decade of the twentieth century over their place and their community‟s place in 
South Africa were at least as much about the politics of physical mobility as about labor 
and economic mobility.  In addition to defending their economic interests against the 
European elites in the Transvaal and elsewhere in the territories that would join to make 
South Africa, resident Indians were fighting to become and to be recognized by others as 
part of the South African political community.  These Asian-European struggles 
significantly constructed a common understanding of the existence of a South African 
political community. Especially in a study of the formation of citizenship, the identity 
and understanding of the political community cannot be assumed but must be 
explained.
11
  I will return to this theme of the leading role of the Asian community in the 
final section of this paper, suggesting that it may be the refugee community (broadly 
understood) that plays a similar role in the contemporary development of South African 
citizenship. This angle on the history of South African citizenship may fruitfully be cast 
as the creation of bureaucratically defined populations as understood by Dean and 
Foucault, employing the notion of statecraft and the specific concepts of territory, 
population, and discipline?
12
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N. Rose. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.  The greatest point of affinity appears to be through 
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may well be linkages to explore between the legal cultural concept of official residence and contemporary 
The next section examines the dark side of South African citizenship and argues 
that the xenophobic violence is consistent with and draws upon the official residence 
character of South African citizenship.
13
 The official residence script remains dominant 
as opposed to other arguably ascendant but not yet dominant concepts such as republican 
or nativist citizenship.  Disturbingly, such consistency thus reveals what might be termed 
the dark side of citizenship in South Africa, even without recourse to the influence of 
nativist discourse.   Reflecting on this, I note that the heroic proposition that opposition to 
apartheid kept alive the flame of the rule of law meets its inversion in the xenophobic 
violence where South Africa‟s relatively strong legal culture arguably fanned the 
xenophobic flames.  The final section of the chapter turns to the politics of contemporary 
South African citizenship.  Noting several different views of how such politics are 
structured, it argues that the current contestation over the place of migrants in South 
African society (of which the xenophobic violence is but an extreme manifestation) is a 
primary generative site of South African citizenship.  Furthermore, given the still 
dominant official residence script of South African citizenship, these politics may be 
generating a form of denizenship citizenship which would paradoxically provide space 
for migrants – despite at least some of their expressed desires to stay and quickly move 
on – in our cities as well as in the South African community. 
 
Part One:  The Dark Side of South African Citizenship
14
 
 
In the standard accounts of this violence available thus far, sixty-two persons lost 
their lives as violence flared first in Gauteng and then later in KwaZulu-natal and the 
Western Cape as well.
15
   The civil society/humanitarian response was an initially 
                                                                                                                                                 
disciplines of territorial governmentality.  One difference between this chapter and other contributions in 
this volume is the relatively greater explanatory emphasis placed here on official residence rather than on 
status as native born or as such status may also be termed „the naturalization of difference based on 
spatial/national origins‟. 
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  Both elements (the linkage to violence and the official residence character of citizenship) of this 
proposition are hotly contested by a number of South African citizens.  In the view of one commentator on 
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is their place of nativity that is important.” 
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 The discussion here is taken from J Klaaren „Viewed from the Past, the Future of South African 
Citizenship‟ FMSP Working Paper Number __ (12 May 2009, available at www.migration.org.za). 
15
  See above, note ___.   
heartening one though, at least in Gauteng, it proved unsustainable.  Apart from the 
provincial declarations and bureaucratic classifications noted above, the official state 
responses to the violence may best be understood as sporadic and half-hearted.
16
  In any 
event, apart from the immediate and institutional responses, South African and other 
global citizens were forced by the events to ponder questions such as why the violence 
emerged.  As further explored in the introduction to this volume, most explanations 
highlighted factors including border anxieties and job fears, the persistent effects of 
apartheid, the lack of service and delivery and poverty.  One explanation was largely 
dismissive – calling the violence the result of criminal elements and based upon nothing 
structural or systemic.  The most empirically-informed explanation yet presented is based 
on research conducted at FMSP.
 17
  This research does not dismiss systemic causes or the 
existence of structural xenophobia but depicts the episode as essentially the result of 
specific gaps of leadership at local level – violence as the uncontained product of 
gangsters in various local communities and structures.  Violence was prevented where 
democratic, state-linked leadership was strong.  Doubtless more explanations and 
evidence will emerge as scholars are currently and urgently engaged in these debates.  
These debates will not be settled easily. 
A significant enabling factor in at the least the last of these explanations (the one 
based on the FMSP research) may well be an element of legal culture that many 
(particularly in national elites) would wish were not in fact part of the national 
environment.  Put simply it is the following proposition:  xenophobia may well be the 
dark side of South African citizenship.  The inverse but intimate relationship of 
xenophobia and citizenship might be argued to be a feature of legal culture generally.
18
  
Be that as it may, the connection between the two can be argued to be particularly strong 
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in the South African case.  This is so based upon two attributes of South African 
citizenship are foundational to the South African concept:  official status/lawfulness and 
residence.  While it is currently undergoing a process of contestation, at present the 
cultural conception of citizenship in South Africa is characterized by a concept of official 
residence.  Belonging to the South African national community is not underpinned by a 
notion of republican citizenship or by a kind of cultural citizenship (of which nativism 
might be a version) or by a notion of cosmopolitan citizenship.
19
  The two defining 
attributes of this official residence form of citizenship are those of residence/stakeholding 
and of official status/lawfulness.  At least for purposes of argument, the remainder of this 
section assumes that the reigning notion of citizenship is indeed best characterized in this 
way.   
What we can now examine is the degree to which each of these defining factors 
enables xenophobia.  First, xenophobia may itself be heightened to the extent that the 
character of citizenship is itself dependent primarily upon official status or lawfulness.  
The emotion behind the charge of „go home or die here‟ is the righteous cry rather than 
the shout of hatred.  The very same feeling that articulates „I belong here and I have 
rights that I may demand‟ may also articulate „I belong here and thus I have the right to 
oust you‟.  This understanding is reflected empirically in the Alexandra example 
discussed by Tamlyn Monson in her chapter in this collection.
20
  In Alexandra, the 
violence was seen as a supplement to the state‟s authority rather than as a form of 
opposition or as an exception to the state‟s authority as were the cases in the other two 
empirical examples she presents.  In Alexandra, the residents mobilized to attempt to oust 
undocumented foreigners, essentially bolstering and supplementing the immigration 
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policy of the national state.  This relatively limited form of righteous violence is the weak 
form of the strong form of xenophobic violence that took the forms of murder and rape.  
Thus, while recognizing the diversity of local responses and situations, the Alexandra 
situation of ultimate alignment with the national migration regime may be viewed as the 
archetype of the May 2008 xenophobic violence.
21
  
Still, we must add into this discussion of the enabling of xenophobia through 
official status or lawfulness the paradoxical additional power given by the negotiation of 
the official and the lawful.  In particular, we should not lose sight of the degree to which 
the very illegality of the official or other action was itself powerful.  Indeed, it can be 
argued that South African migration policing is a practice where the state paradoxically 
exploits and promotes illegality.
22
  If so, in the same way in which the state policy uses 
illegality to achieve its purposes, so did and can communities.  In this sense, breaking the 
law may also be a form (a powerful form) of taking the law into one‟s own hands. 
Second, xenophobia may also be heightened by the character of South African 
citizenship through its other constitutive element – residence.  Residence is of course at 
root a place of belonging.  Such a sense of belonging – rooted within the popular and 
legal culture of South Africa -- may firmly ground the exclusive logic of xenophobia and 
fuel its related violence.  As noted above, the most persuasive explanation offered thus 
far for the 2008 violence uses a local frame for its explanation – a lack of local 
leadership.  The concept of residence within South African culture is, of course, not 
necessarily a one for one match with local belonging.  In addition to mediation through 
law, notions of residence may be mediated through significant national interpretations of 
belonging.  In any case, whether inflected through national institutions or not, a 
residential character to citizenship is at least consistent with a feeling and sense of local 
belonging and entitlement.
23
  To that extent, the residential attribute to South African 
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Today 35-47 (2001) (detailing illegal but accepted practices of migration policing). 
23
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citizenship appears to have underpinned the fundamentally local forms of violence seen 
in May 2008. 
The character of residence in contemporary South African understanding of 
citizenship might be illustrated through attention to struggles over residence in apartheid 
times.  As noted by Richard Abel, campaigns to win residence rights for urban blacks 
were crucial to the struggle against apartheid in the 1980s.
24
  One aspect of these 
campaigns seen in the Komani case was the fight for the possibility of a wife and a 
husband to live together.
25
  This is part of residence.  One of the grounds of the litigation 
was that of suitable accommodation – such being made a precondition for permission to 
reside.  This is part of residence.  In the Komani test case, Veli Willie Komani was a 
lawful resident and Nonceba Mercy Meriba Komani was an unlawful resident.  In this 
litigation, the lawyers for the Komanis argued that making the rights of persons exempted 
from the permit system as “natives born and permanently residing” in the area could not 
be dependent on the discretion of administrators.  Another test case discussed by Abel 
concerned the degree to which one could go on annual leave – leaving a place but 
returning regularly to that place.  Again, this is part of the concept of residence. 
While this argument for the salience of the residential understandings in the 
violence remains to be conclusively demonstrated, there is perhaps some corroboration in 
the features of the politics of the responses to the xenophobic violence.  These politics 
were essentially provincial politics.  And that meant provincial-local politics.  The 
politics of citizenship in response to the xenophobic violence did not, by and large, occur 
at national level but were rather provincial and local phenomena.  As explored elsewhere 
in this collection, the Western Cape had a relatively good response to the violence and the 
Gauteng Province did not.  In both cases, the ferment was at the provincial level – once 
which may be elided with the local one for analytical purposes here.  Indeed, this elision 
was made manifest in the Gauteng by the leading role played in the coordination of the 
GPG response by the MEC for Local Government, Qedani Mahlangu, and officials of her 
department. 
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   1980 (4) SA 448 Komani NO v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area.  For a depiction of 
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 The residential axis of citizenship mobilized in the xenophobic violence of May 
2008 may also help to explain why a full one-third of the victims were those of South 
African nationality.  Some of those were perhaps mistaken victims but more than those 
were mobilized against on the basis of their particular identity – their residential status.  
In this reading, such non-South African victims were mobilized against for having a non-
local identity.  They were not local – it did not matter if they held South African 
nationality or not.  While close to ethnic mobilization – for instance mobilization on the 
basis of an anti-Pedi or Shangaan sentiment per se – what is argued for here is of course 
conceptually distinct.   
 Of course, these conceptual linkages I have sketched are not manifestly evident 
and are themselves contested.  As such they must remain speculative.  But they are 
consistent with lawful residence character of South African citizenship.  Deployed in 
certain localities – and unrestrained by a sense of civility or shared security or destiny 
such as may also inhere within notions of citizenship – citizenship as a script of lawful 
residence had and has its dark and violent side. 
It is of course a perversion of the ideals of the South African constitution for 
crowd members to take matters into their own hands and to hound and maim and kill 
foreign nationals as well as South African nationals.
26
  But it is a commonplace to 
observe that the Constitution is not fully implemented and this would extend to its formal 
rights of safety and security as well.  Indeed, it may be important not to overplay the 
xenophobic violence.  In the violent society with the number of daily murders as well as 
deaths due to road traffic accidents as well as in the course of the AIDS epidemic, the 
sixty-two deaths are more part and parcel of everyday South African life than the 
noteworthy exception. What was the exception, as pointed out by Julia Hornberger, was 
the sort of cosmopolitan and inclusive ordering that the victims demanded and the police 
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actually surprisingly to some provided when the displaced persons moved to the police 
stations and demanded refuge.
27
  That was the exception – the rule was the more ordinary 
and the now-revealed in all its ugliness two-sided nature of lawful residence citizenship.
28
 
To this point, I have argued that South African citizenship has demonstrated its 
dark side and that it was plausible enabler if not instigator of the violence.  In this respect, 
what this volume addresses as the demonic was lawful – at least according to that dark 
code.  But what of the usual narrative of law, of its heroic role in particular in the struggle 
against apartheid?  In concluding, this section addresses that question against the 
background of recent discussions of the place of law in the politics of apartheid.  The flip 
side of the two distinct propositions that law provided a site of struggle against apartheid 
in South Africa and that law was kept alive through that struggle is that post-apartheid 
law may also facilitate violence against those seen not to be lawful or official rights-
bearers. 
Once we put aside a view of law as a system of domination that was in service of 
apartheid, we can say that there were two broad views of the role of law in anti-apartheid 
work, understood here as ideal types.  The first is the liberal one.  One of its foremost and 
thoughtful proponents during that time was a then-youthful Edwin Cameron, who has 
recently been appointed as a Justice of the Constitutional Court.
29
  Cameron recognized 
in eloquent language the depravity of the apartheid system and its injustices.  He 
recognized as well their systemic nature and the need for legal revolution rather than 
reform.  Yet, in his view, the institutions of the rule of law should be the last ones 
jettisoned if such were necessary in the exigencies of the struggle.  Rather, it was to be 
applauded that lawyers through opposition to apartheid evils had kept the ideal of the rule 
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South Africa and Others [2004] ZACC 5; 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC); 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC). 
29
  For a recent symposium on Edwin Cameron‟s influence within the development of the South African 
legal system, see (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights __.  For one representative exposition 
of Cameron‟s views, see E Cameron „Rights, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law‟ 114 South African 
Law Journal 504 (1997). 
of law alive in South Africa – such was a gift to the post-apartheid nation.  The 
contrasting view sees law as playing a role more within struggle.  The title of the book by 
Richard Abel chronicling these struggles after the fact puts its well:  Politics by Other 
Means:  Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid.
30
 In this view, law was a form of politics.  
In this perspective, to ask whether the rule of law was valid was a bit beside the point.  
Where legal victories were achieved, the rule of law appeared; where there were defeats, 
there was no rule of law or only a conservative formalistic version of the doctrine.  These 
two views here are given as ideal types and put in exaggerated form, but the spectrum 
between the two is what is of interest. 
Each of these two views may be associated with a particular proposition.  For the 
first, the proposition is that law itself was kept alive through legal struggle against 
apartheid during that period.  Post-apartheid law thus owes its legitimacy and vitality 
such legal struggles.  For the second, the proposition is not that law was kept alive but 
rather than law functioned as a form of politics during apartheid and functions again as a 
form of politics in a post-apartheid setting, although that setting is one with 
fundamentally changed politics.  
At least from the first viewpoint, there is perhaps a bit of a startle in the notion 
that the very rule of law that was carefully kept alive through the days of anti-apartheid 
struggle and which underpins inter alia the Constitution is now also to be thought of as a 
factor in abetting xenophobic violence.  This comes about because the understanding of 
law‟s power depended upon by the heroic view of law against apartheid – the normative 
power of the law – is most often rhetorically employed against violence in official sites 
yet was also so powerfully deployed against particular individuals and victims in popular 
sites in May 2008.  Perhaps one should not be so startled for of course, stories that tell of 
powerful heroes tell also of powerful villains. 
 
Part Two:  What is our contemporary politics of citizenship?  Has our post-
apartheid citizenship politics been changed by the post-xenophobic violence and if 
so, how? 
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 See Politics By Other Means, note ___. 
The understanding presented in the previous section sees an essential continuity 
between the dominant concept of citizenship in South Africa and the phenomenon of the 
xenophobic attacks.  This view differs from other understandings of the logic or scripts of 
citizenship and how they are currently structured and may be of assistance in explaining 
the recent xenophobic violence. 
Before surveying some varieties of views on the scripts of citizenship in 
contemporary South Africa, it is important to note that such specific visions are set within 
larger visions of the current state of citizenship politics globally.  Here, one may discern 
two poles.  On one side, the school of citizenship studies argues the limited proposition 
that the policy significance of citizenship is increasing at the present time.
31
  This 
argument stands in contrast to the claims, on the other side, of some versions of 
globalization detecting the emergence of a globalized post-national citizenship.
32
  Seen in 
this light, the current and increasing focus in South Africa on citizenship is an example of 
a global trend rather than a post-apartheid reaction to denial of equal citizenship.  In 
between these two poles lies the sort of citizenship politics that are at issue here.  Our 
South African politics are clearly neither a manifestation of globalized post-national 
citizenship nor merely experiencing a minor tick in the policy relevance of citizenship. 
So what are our contemporary politics of citizenship?  One view (if perhaps 
immanent) is contained in some relatively recent writing of the path-breaking legal 
anthropologists, Jean and John Comaroff.
33
  The Comaroffs are native to South Africa, 
but have a principal academic and residential base at the University of Chicago in North 
America.  Their research has identified two parallel discourses in South Africa – a 
negative discourse regarding migrants and foreign nationals and an equally negative 
discourse regarding non-indigenous plants.  The juxtaposition of the two allows for 
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  A Aleinikoff and D Klusmeyer (eds) Citizenship Today (2001); A Aleinikoff and D Klusmeyer 
Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration (2002). 
32
  See e.g. Y Soysal, Limits of Citizenship:  Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (1994); D 
Jacobsen, Rights Across Borders:  Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (1996).  See also J Meyer 
„The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State:  A World Society Perspective‟ in G Steinmetz (ed) 
State/Culture:  State-Formation after the Cultural Turn (1999) 123-143. 
33
  J Comaroff & J Comaroff, „Naturing the Nation:  Aliens, Apocalypse and the Postcolonial State‟ 27 
Journal of Southern African Studies 627-651 (2001).  This view appears largely congruent with that of 
Peter Geschiere.  See P Geschiere and F Nyamnjoh „Capitalism and Autochthony:  The Seesaw of Mobility 
and Belonging‟ 12 Public Culture 423-452 (2000) (detecting a continent-wide movement towards 
autochthony (indigenous belonging). 
cutting-edge but perhaps somewhat precarious insights and theorizing around the 
discourse of the alien.  In the Comaroffs‟ view, “aliens – both plants and people – come 
to embody core contradictions of boundedness and belonging.  And alien-nature provides 
a language for voicing new forms of discrimination within a culture of „post-racism‟ and 
civil rights”.  The implication of their analysis of the contours of these discourses is there 
is a substantial ferment towards indigenous belonging and nativist sentiment in South 
Africa.  While the Comaroffs may have only implied such a powerful position for a 
contemporary nativist discourse, others make the case directly.
34
 
In terms of accuracy of perception of South African politics, there is much of 
value in the Comaroffs‟ view.  Today, we see a significant and arguably growing 
discourse of South Africans first.  And that discourse does at times provide a vehicle for 
the articulation of racist and rights-denying sentiments.  Nonetheless, at other times, for 
instance, in its articulation in Constitutional Court debates primarily in the writings of 
Ngcobo J, the ascendant discourse is by no means a racist one although it does represent 
a challenge to the reigning lawful residence conception of South African citizenship. In 
any event, the significance of this discourse remains open to assessment and should not in 
my view be overstated.  While a nativist discourse is present in its popular and public 
debates, South Africa has not gone nativist.  This is certainly the case assessing national 
practice at an institutional level.  When one examines the judicial, executive, and 
legislative manifestations of South African citizenship in its primary political institutions, 
the South African conception of citizenship – of the meaning of the bounds of the 
national community – appears to remain largely where that concept and those bounds 
were in 1937, as inclusive of those with official residence status.
35
 
In a more complex view of the politics of citizenship in contemporary South 
Africa, Loren Landau both critiques the Comaroffs‟ metaphor and presents a more 
substantial alternative view.  Presenting the results of three years of research into the 
migrant communities in Johannesburg, Landau critiques the Comaroffs metaphor on two 
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  See e.g. Michael Neocosmos „The Politics of Fear and the Fear of Politics‟ (5 June 2008) (identifying “a 
conception of citizenship founded exclusively on indigeneity”) (available at 
http://www.abahlali.org/node/3616, accessed 19 January 2010). 
35
  A potentially interesting line of enquiry would look at the place of official residence within the discourse 
of ANC party politics.  To some extent, one might limit the empirical argument in this chapter to the 
institutionalized side of a distinction between institutionalized conceptions of citizenship and 
public/popular ones.  I am grateful to Sindiso Mnisi for raising this point. 
counts.  One is that it implies the existence of an objective and definable native 
community shaped by its physical environment – which is not the case since few blacks 
have grown up in the city centre.  Secondly, he argues that the new migrants are not 
transplants but are consciously transients – he identifies a counter-idiom of transience and 
superiority.  Landau‟s view on the substantive politics of citizenship in South Africa 
stems from this observation and gives rise to a three-part analysis.  In his contribution to 
the collection of essays in „Go Home or Die Here‟, a three part vision of citizenship in 
contemporary South Africa is sketched.  In this view, the middle class holds a 
cosmopolitan view (perhaps reawakened to its urgency by the attacks), the vast masses 
hold a deeply territorialized (but not yet ethnic national view), and the migrant 
communities themselves hold a rights-based but self-exclusionary view.
36
  In Landau‟s 
scheme, „[f]or the mobs and those sympathetic to them, the Fanonian violence will go a 
step further [than an overt assertion of a territorially bound community], strengthening 
the principle that South Africa belongs to all who were born in it.‟37  As detailed in his 
earlier piece, the migrant discourse of transience and superiority is opposed to an 
exclusivist discourse of citizenship by black South Africans (identified primarily with the 
masses in this scheme).  The opposition between the two is then generative of post-
apartheid nation building – with the pointed (for white South Africans) implication being 
that where the nation is being built is on the side of black South Africans, in particular 
those who are newly exploring their access to the city of Johannesburg.  Landau, 
however, also notes the urban phenomenon whereby both migrants and black South 
Africans are „entering‟ South Africa‟s cities and negotiating their ways to ways of 
belonging there. 
So where does all this take us?  Agreeing largely with Landau, I would suggest 
that the current struggles of migrants for official status are at the centre of the generative 
politics of contemporary SA citizenship.  The transience of migrants fits within an 
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and E Worby (eds) Go Home or Die Here:  Violence, Xenophobia, and the Reinvention of Difference in 
South Africa (2008) 105-117. 
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  Ibid at 114 (emphasis in the original).  There are a number of institutional locations where nativist 
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continuing convention of the Department of Home Affairs to grant citizenship to children born to one 
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official residence paradigm – they need legal status while transient here.  And migrants 
demand such status – at least in their interactions with the Department of Home Affairs 
even if not through collective political formations.  Migrants by and large do not organize 
collectively but instead deal with the DHA on an individual level.
38
  In this, they exert a 
pressure on citizenship that is distinct from that put onto citizenship from other quarters 
in contemporary South Africa.  These other pressures appear to constitute a drive for 
citizenship in order to achieve and enjoy rights in a globalizing economy (derived largely 
from elites) and a drive for citizenship in order to enjoy the delivery of benefits and 
services and the enjoyment of opportunities to which members of the South African 
political community ought to enjoy (derived largely from non-elites).  Consistent with 
their paradigmatic occupation of a space in a city, migrants are asserting a place within 
the South African population broadly understood, however transient and superior that 
desired place may be. 
Put into the theoretical terms of a historical and institutional analysis, migrants 
indeed occupy a great deal of the bureaucratic site that generates current understandings 
of South African citizenship.  Most scholarship in the nativist and exclusivist vein sees 
migrants serving as a convenient but external foil.  Migrants are the other and are the 
subject of various mechanisms of othering.  Instead, I would suggest that migrants are us.  
Migrants in contemporary South Africa and the opposition to their place are generating 
and re-generating our contemporary script of South African citizenship.  This occurs in 
particular through the contestation and regulation of their status as lawful residents.
39
  
Both through the generative power of discourse (even and perhaps especially xenophobic 
discourse) and through the appropriation of the official residence concept, migrants are 
literally crossing the line daily into the South African political community.  Despite their 
own desire to be in but not of South Africa, migrants are not just present in our cities; we 
are also present in theirs. 
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Conclusion 
Three implications of the above line of thinking may be drawn in conclusion.  
First, we may need to recognize today‟s migrants as the new Asians.  Or, one could say, 
Asians were the old migrants.  Using a historical method, we might then usefully 
compare the xenophobic violence with several of the instances of collective violence 
levied against Asians in the South Africa‟s past. 
Second, we may have to face the unavoidable implication is that xenophobic 
violence is normal within South African society.  This means that further violence is 
likely to occur.  It also means that even violence on the scale of the attacks of May 2008 
is not likely to have been of such national significance to have changed in any significant 
way our politics.  Instead, it may well be the case that today‟s xenophobic violence is 
reflective of interinstitutional contradictions and is built-in.
40
  Indeed, echoing the view of 
at least one contemporaneous commentator, one election campaign after the attacks, we 
still have not seen any significant political capital being made of opposing migration.
41
  
For those liberal constitutionalists who wish to see in the South African constitution a 
theory of postnational citizenship – equal rights for equal persons equally everywhere – 
this recognition will be a disappointment.  The operative logic of South African 
citizenship is considerably less clean than that.  At the very least, it may oscillate towards 
the demonic. 
Third, it may be that the demand for the recognition of transience pushes the 
official residence paradigm away from its focus on the permanent residence status and 
towards a greater embrace of a spectrum of residential categories.  In this way, the South 
African polity may be pushed towards embracing full-blown denizenship as its logic of 
citizenship.  This concept is usually defined as granting membership in a community on 
the basis of residence rather than nationality.
42
  Denizenship is a contemporary concept 
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that loosen what he terms „the Strict Congruency Thesis‟.  This thesis holds that the Constitution (in 
Aleinikoff‟s writing, the US Constitution) protects its nationals and only protects its nationals.  In contrast, 
Aleinikoff explores ways in which the United States Constitution has and should protect a broader group of 
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